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DEFAMATION OF TEACHERS: BEHIND THE TIMES?
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,' the Supreme
Court applied the first amendment 2 to state libel3 laws for the first time.
To safeguard freedom of speech, this decision makes proof of the com-
mon law elements of defamation4* insufficient when a public official brings
a defamation action against a critic of his official conduct.' Plaintiffs in
such actions instead are required to prove that the defendant published a
statement with "actual malice."6 That is, the plaintiff must show, by
evidence of convincing clarity,7 that the defendant either knew the state-
ment was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity.'
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. U.S. Const. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ... ").
3. Libel is defined as "that which is communicated by the sense of sight." See Pros-
ser & Keeton on Torts § 112 (5th ed. 1984). Slander is generally communicated orally.
See id.
4. Defamation is defined as a communication "which tends to injure 'reputation' in
the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good-will or confidence in which the
plaintiff is held." Id. at § 111. Under the common law rules of defamation, a plaintiff
must show the statement at issue referred to him, was false, defamatory and "pub-
Hished"--that is, seen or heard by a third party. See eg., Walters v. Linhof, 559 F. Supp.
1231, 1234 (D. Colo. 1983). The plaintiff also must prove the defendant's fault, at least to
the point of negligence. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
In an action for slander, which is generally a spoken defamation, see Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 568 (1977), a plaintiff also must show financial loss caused by the defama-
tory statement unless it falls into one of the "slander per se" categories. See id. at §§ 570-
75. These categories include the imputation of the commission of a serious crime, see id.
at § 571, the accusation the plaintiff has a loathsome disease, see id. at § 572, the imputa-
tion of sexual misconduct (generally limited to female plaintiffs), see id. at § 574, com-
ment c, and statements that tend to injure the plaintiff in his business or profession. See.
eg., Manale v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Police, 673 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir. 1982)
(imputation of homosexuality to a police officer). This Note is limited to the subject of
statements relating to school teachers' professional qualifications and job performance,
triggering the "professional reputation" category of slander per se. Therefore, no special
damages need be proved in teacher slander actions. Actions for libel require no proof of
special damages. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (1977).
5. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964) (plaintiff was an
elected Commissioner of Public Affairs for the City of Montgomery, Alabama, which
"clearly" made him a public official for purposes of the new actual malice rule); infira
notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
6. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. To act with "actual malice," a defendant
must make the statement in question "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.; see also Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (defendant must entertain "serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication").
7. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86; see also Loeb v. New Tunes Communi-
cations Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 92 n.!1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defining "convincing clarity" as
a "standard intermediate between the normal 'preponderance of the evidence' civil stan-
dard and the 'beyond the reasonable doubt' criminal standard. ") (quoting Nader v. de
Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. App. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980)).
8. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
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The New York Times Court intentionally used vague language 9 to de-
fine the limits of "public official."" ° Despite the Court's intention to pro-
tect comments made about some of society's important contributors,"
the decision's lack of clarity has fostered an imprecise doctrine governing
when a defamation plaintiff is deemed a public official for purposes of the
New York Times actual malice standard.
1 2
The resulting unpredictability of the public official inquiry becomes
especially apparent when applied to the question of whether public
school teachers should be held to the actual malice standard in defama-
tion actions arising out of statements made about their qualifications or
professional performance.13 Some state courts conclude teachers are sub-
ject to the New York Times actual malice standard because they are pub-
lic officials. 14 Others impose the New York Times standard because they
find teachers are public figures.' 5 A third group holds teachers to be
neither public officials nor public figures and requires only that teachers
meet the traditional, common law burden of proof to recover damages
for defamation. 6 The disagreement among courts stems from a funda-
mental misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent in this area.
17
This Note proposes that a correct reading of the Supreme Court guide-
9. See id. at 283 n.23 (1964) (Court expressly declined to "determine the boundaries
of the 'public official' concept").
10. Indeed, Federal Judge Alexander A. Lawrence of Georgia has compared the task
of determining who is a public plaintiff to "trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." See
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) aff'd, 580 F.2d
859 (1978) (alleged organized crime figure held to actual malice standard on public figure
theory).
11. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269. "The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system". Id.
(quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 29-38.
13. Compare Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App.
1978) (holding teacher is a public official for New York Times purposes) with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 283, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1997 (1988) (teacher not a public official).
14. See Sewell, 119 Ariz. at 425, 581 P.2d at 270; Basarich v. Roedeghero, 24 II1.
App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974).
15. See Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442,
447 (1975); Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 217, 626 P.2d 785, 790 (1981).
16. See Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136-37
(1979); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d
257, 263-64 (Me. 1986); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362
S.E.2d 32, 37 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1997 (1988).
17. The courts that hold teachers not to be public officials rely primarily on the "ap-
parent governmental authority" prong of the test set forth in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 85 (1966). See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. Those holding teachers to
the actual malice standard on a public official theory rely on the "independent public
interest" prong of the Rosenblatt test. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86; infra notes 60-68
and accompanying text. An improper application of the first Rosenblatt prong allows
some courts to conclude, after an incomplete inquiry, that teachers are not New York
Times public officials. See infra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
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lines requires courts to conclude that public school teachers must be held
to the New York Times actual malice standard because they are public
officials. In the alternative, public school teachers should be required to
prove actual malice because they can be considered public figures under
the rule of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts'8 and its progeny, 9 in which
the Supreme Court removed the "public official" limitation in applying
the actual malice requirement and held that private individuals who play
influential roles in society are also subject to the actual malice burden.20
Part I of this Note briefly traces the origins and development of the
current New York Times doctrine. Part II examines the application of
that doctrine to teacher defamation plaintiffs and demonstrates that, as
"public officials",21 teachers should be required to prove actual malice.
Part III demonstrates that teachers otherwise are public figures under
Curtis and therefore should be subject to the actual malice requirement.
This Note concludes that, to achieve the ends sought by New York
Times, the encouragement of robust and open discussion on an issue crit-
ical to the public good, school teachers must be held to the New York
Times standard.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES PUBLIC
OFFICIAL STANDARD
In the New York Times22 decision, the Supreme Court expressed "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' To that end, the
Court injected a constitutional inquiry into state defamation actions by
holding that even a false and defamatory statement was entitled to first
amendment protection24 if the statement was made about a public official
and criticized his official conduct.2" This protection took the form of the
18. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-66 (1979) (plaintiff
not sufficiently involved in the controversy created by his aunt and uncle, who were con-
victed of espionage, to be designated a public figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974) (attorney did not become public figure by representing plaintiff in
a notorious case).
20. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, CJ., con-
curring in the result) ("Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the con-
duct of [public figures], and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about
their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public
officials.' ").
21. The application of the public official doctrine to teachers in private schools impli-
cates first amendment concerns beyond the scope of this Note, which is limited to the
topic of teachers in public schools. However, the grade level of school taught by teacher
defamation plaintiffs, be it elementary school, high school or college, makes no difference
to this Note's analysis. The rights implicated and the interests deserving protection re-
main the same regardless of the students' ages.
22. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
23. Id. at 270.
24. See id. at 273.
25. See id. at 256.
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actual malice standard, which serves as a barrier between a public official
defamation plaintiff and recovery of damages26 by requiring the plaintiff
to prove the defendant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of his
statement.27
A. Definition of "Public Official" Under New York Times v. Sullivan
Lower courts originally applied the New York Times actual malice
standard exclusively to "libel action[s] brought by a public official against
critics of his official conduct."2 The Supreme Court purposely left unde-
fined the nature of this public official defamation plaintiff in its opin-
ion, 9 and has never expressly defined it. Subsequently, in Rosenblatt v.
Baer,3° the Court came the closest it has ever come to issuing definitive
guidelines as to who is or is not a public official for New York Times
purposes.31
Rosenblatt sets forth a two-pronged test.32 If both prongs produce an
affirmative answer, the plaintiff is a public official. The first, more general
prong emphasizes the apparent amount of government authority or con-
trol the plaintiff has at his command ("apparent governmental authority
test").33  The second, more specific prong stresses the amount of interest
the public has in the way the plaintiff performs his job ("independent
public interest test").34 Defamation plaintiffs considered to be public offi-
cials under this analysis run the gamut from an assistant public de-
fender3" to the United States Ambassador to Chile.36 Within this
26. See id. at 292 (overturning damage award since communication was "at the very
center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression" and no actual malice was
demonstrated).
27. See supra note 6.
28. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256. The type of criticism governed by New
York Times was clarified in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (New York
Times rule covers statements criticizing "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness for office").
29. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23 ("We have no occasion here to deter-
mine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official'
designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of
persons who would or would not be included.").
30. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
31. See id. at 85-86. Despite the Rosenblatt Court's caveat that "[n]o precise lines
need be drawn for the purposes of this case," it held that "[t]he thrust of New York Times
is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong ... the Constitution
limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation." Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 85 ("[T]he 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.").
34. See id. at 86 ("Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and perform-
ance of all government employees ... the New York Times malice standards apply.")
(footnote omitted).
35. See Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D. Del. 1980).
36. See Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 595 F. Supp. 982, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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spectrum, police officers37 and public school teachers 38 also have been
held to be public officials under the Rosenblatt standard.
B. Public Figure Analysis
The Court expanded the scope of the actual malice doctrine in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts39 when it held that plaintiffs characterized as pub-
licfigures also must be covered by the Times standard.' Public figures
are distinguishable from private parties, the Court reasoned, and as such
should be required to prove actual malice because they not only "com-
mand] sufficient continuing public interest, [but] ha[ve] sufficient access
to the means of counterargument" to expose the allegedly defamatory
nature of the publications" (the "self-help" theory of public figure
analysis).42
The Court further developed the public figure analysis offered in Curtis
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,g which requires defamation plaintiffs to
"invite attention and comment" before they will be held to the New York
Times standard.' According to Gertz, this can be done in either of two
ways: by occupying a position "of such persuasive power and influence
that [a plaintiff is] deemed [a] public figure[ ] ... for all purposes,"4 or
37. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting & Cable, 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1187
(1986); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985).
38. See e.g., Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App.
1978); Luper v. Black Dispatch Pub. Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Okla. 1983).
39. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Interestingly, the facts in this landmark case revolve around
public schools. Butts was the athletic director of the University of Georgia, employed by
the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation. See id. at 135. He was accused,
in print, by the Saturday Evening Post of conspiring to "fix" a game. See id.
In the Curtis companion case of Associated Press v. Walker, the plaintiff was a politi-
cally active private citizen depicted by the wire service as having led a charge against
federal marshalls attempting to carry out the court-ordered registration of a black student
at the University of Mississippi. See id. at 140.
40. See id. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) ("Evenly applied to cases
involving 'public men'-whether they be 'public officials' or 'public figures'-f[the New
York Times doctrine] will afford the necessary insulation for the fundamental interests
which the First Amendment was designed to protect.").
41. See id. at 155. The court stretched the New York Times net the furthest in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In that case, the actual malice requirement
was imposed on a distributor of nudist magazines. See id. at 44-45 (plurality opinion).
The Rosenbloom Court held that the nature of the controversy from which the defama-
tion arose would decide the actual malice question, rather than the plaintiff's designation
as a public official or public figure. See id. at 44. The actual malice obstacle between a
defamation plaintiff and recovery was extended "to all discussion and communication
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons
involved are famous or anonymous." Id.
42. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1979).
44. See id. at 345. Plaintiff Elmer Gertz was representing a plaintiff in a wrongful
death action against a Chicago police officer convicted of murdering a young man. Even
though the defamation plaintiff at bar was involved indisputedly in a matter of public
interest, the Court declined to impose the actual malice requirement. See id. at 325.
45. Id. at 345.
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by "thrust[ing] [oneself] to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved" 46 (the "risk-
assumption" theory).
The Court continues to use the "self-help" and "risk assumption" the-
ories of Curtis and Gertz to determine who is a public figure for purposes
of defamation law.4 Lower courts have invoked these rationales to find
a variety of defamation plaintiffs to be public figures and subject to the
burden of proving actual malice, including a political action group, 48 an
air traffic controller,49 the vice president and general manager of a radio
station,50 and professors at a public college. 1
II. NEW YORK TIMES AND TEACHERS
When a defamation plaintiff is a school teacher, the answer to the cru-
cial actual malice question becomes virtually unpredictable. Some state
courts hold teachers to the actual malice standard because they find them
to be public officials under the Rosenblatt test.5 2 Others reach the same
conclusion because they find teachers to be public figures. 53 Still others
hold that teacher defamation plaintiffs should not be required to prove
actual malice, because they are neither public officials 54 nor public
figures.55 Thus, the need for a more uniform approach is evident.
46. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 345 (A private individual is not subject to the New
York Times standard because "[h]e has not accepted public office or assumed an 'influen-
tial role in ordering society'.") (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result)). See also supra notes 98-104 and accom-
panying text.
47. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (finding televi-
sion preacher all-purpose public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135
(1979) (recipient of federal grants and a "Golden Fleece" award not a limited purpose
public figure by virtue of receiving federal funds for his research); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976) (Palm Beach socialite not a limited purpose public figure
merely because her divorce was a matter of public record).
48. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988).
49. See Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff was on duty at time of crash), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
50. See O'Donnell v. CBS, Inc., 782 F.2d 1414, 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff claimed
he was defamed by broadcasts announcing his dismissal for unethical professional
practices).
51. See Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31111. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442,
447 (1975) (professors at junior college embroiled in textbook selection controversy);
Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 217, 626 P.2d 785, 790 (1981) (medical school professor
accused of racism).
52. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App. 1978);
Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974).
53. See Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442,
447 (1975); Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 216-17, 626 P.2d 785, 790 (1981).
54. See, e.g., Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136
(1979).
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A. Teachers as Public Officials
Because public school teachers work for local governments 56 and are
paid with public funds, state courts first must decide whether school
teachers are public officials for New York Times purposes.57 Decisions
vary on this question because courts apply the Supreme Court's public
official standard set forth in Rosenblatt v. Baer58 inconsistently.
Courts reaching the conclusion that public school teachers are not
New York Times public officials find that teachers lack sufficient "appar-
ent governmental authority" to come within Rosenblatt's parameters. 59
Thus, they foreclose the Rosenblatt "independent public interest" in-
quiry' ° by answering the first Rosenblatt question-that of "apparent
governmental authority"-in the negative.6'
These courts find that teachers possess inadequate government author-
ity by equating the amount of apparent governmental authority neces-
sary to satisfy Rosenblatt with the amount of governmental control
vested in elected or policymaking officials.6 2 Because it is clear that
56. See, e.g., Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.F2d 739 (1974); Cal.
Educ. Code § 44830 (West 1978); N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
57. Working for a government entity and being paid with public funds form the mini-
mum requirements before a defamation plaintiff can be categorized as a public official.
See Note, Teachers as Plaintiffs in Defamations: Determination of Their Status as Public
Officials or Public Figures, 24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 431, 437-38 (1984).
58. 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966). Compare Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979) (interpreting Rosenblatt to protect only criticism of the
"governor" and those who "control the conduct of government") with Basarich v.
Rodeghero, 24 111. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 321 N.E.2d 739, 741-42 (1974) (interpreting
Rosenblatt's "independent public interest" test to include teachers as public officials be-
cause the policies and conduct of teachers "are of as much concern to the community as
are other 'public officials' ").
59. See e.g., Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136
(1979) ("[tlhe governance or control which a public classroom teacher might be said to
exercise over the conduct of government is at most remote and philosophical"); Me-
Cutcheon v. Moran, 99 Ill. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981) ("The rela-
tionship a public school teacher... has with the conduct of government is far too remote
... to justify exposing these individuals [to the actual malice standard."); True v. Ladner,
513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986) ("[T]he authority exercised by a public school teacher is
very limited .... [It] is normally limited to school children within the school building
during ordinary school hours.").
60. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
61. See Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr at 136; Nodar v. Galbreath,
462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); McCutcheon, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 424,425 N.E.2d at 1133;
True, 513 A.2d at 263-64.
62. See e.g., Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 808 ("[W]e cannot conclude that one who accepts
a position as a teacher in a public high school thereby effects the same kind of surrender
of the right to vindicate defamation as does one who seeks or accepts an elected or poli-
cymaking position with a public body or government institution."). The Florida court in
Nodar did require a showing of actual malice by the defendant, but based the requirement
on a theory of conditional privilege rather than the New York Times public official
designation. See id. at 809-10. The privilege was founded on several grounds, including
the listener's interest in receiving information about the performance of an employee,
and, more importantly, that the alleged defamation consisted of "statements of a citizen
1988] 1197
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
teachers do not exercise the same level of government control as mayors
or other elected officials, 63 these opinions categorize the relationship be-
tween public school teachers and the conduct of government as suffi-
ciently remote not to warrant New York Times protection. 6
4
Courts that find teachers to be public officials for New York Times
purposes focus on the "independent public interest" language from Ro-
senblatt.6 1 Under this theory, the public's independent interest in a
school teacher's qualifications and performance satisfies this more spe-
cific prong of the Rosenblatt test because education is a "prime ... re-
sponsibility" 66 of local government and teachers "maintain highly
responsible positions in the community. 67
Thus, it is clear that whether the actual malice standard applies to
public school teacher defamation plaintiffs depends on whether the trial
court is able to find the public official designation appropriate under the
broad Rosenblatt apparent governmental authority prong. If it does, it
then applies the more specific independent public interest prong. Courts
able to reach the second prong invariably hold teachers to the actual
malice standard as public officials.6
B. Teachers Should Be Deemed Public Officials for Purposes
of New York Times
A fundamental misinterpretation of the threshold Rosenblatt inquiry
results in decisions allowing teachers to avoid the actual malice require-
ment. Courts finding teachers to be private defamation plaintiffs consist-
ently misconstrue69 the language from Rosenblatt directing courts to
apply the public official designation "at the very least to those among the
to a political authority regarding matters of public concern, i.e., the school curriculum
and the performance of a public employee." See id. at 810.
63. Election to office undoubtedly makes a defamation plaintiff a public official. See
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964) (elected commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama); see also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 58
(2d Cir. 1980) (mayor of Providence, Rhode Island).
64. See Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979);
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I11. App.
3d 421, 424-25, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1981).
65. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
66. See Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974)
(citing Ill. Const. art. X, § 1).
67. Id. at 892, 321 N.E.2d at 742. In answering the Rosenblatt "independent public
interest" question, the Illinois court, in Basarich v. Rodeghero, required the teacher defa-
mation plaintiff to meet the actual malice standard because "[p]ublic school systems...
are consistent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity" and "[p]ublic
school teachers... and the conduct of such teachers... and [the teachers'] policies are of
as much concern to the community as are other 'public officials' ". Id.
68. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App. 1978);
Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974); Johnston v.
Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978).
69. See Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136-37
(1979); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 807-08 (Fla. 1984); McCutcheon v. Moran,
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hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs." 7° These courts fail to acknowledge that the apparent
governmental authority prong of the Rosenblatt test 71 indicates the mini-
mum, rather than the maximum, number of government employees to be
considered public officials7" and that the Court's language clearly does
not limit the public official designation to those public employees who
make policy or otherwise control the conduct of government.73
If, as Rosenblatt states, the "apparent governmental authority" test is
intended to apply to policymakers and similar public officials near the
top of governmental hierarchy, then it applies to these particular officials
"at the very least."7 4 Thus, the apparent governmental authority inquiry
is meant to begin at the policymaking level, leaving ample room for
courts to apply the standard to school teachers.75
Courts refusing to hold that public school teachers are public officials
misapply the apparent governmental authority test in another way as
well. As the Supreme Court clearly stated, public officials are those
who have "or appear to the public to have"76 the requisite control over,
or responsibility for, government conduct.77 The view that teachers do
not appear to the public to have such authority ignores the teacher's posi-
tion in the community as a role model for his students and as a conspicu-
ous representative of local government to the general population.7"
Thus, the view that school teachers have little or no governmental au-
thority ignores the impact teachers have on their students' daily lives.
The second part of the Rosenblatt test, the independent public interest
in the teacher's qualifications and performance,79 also must result in the
finding that public school teachers are New York Times public officials.
99 Ill. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (1981); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257,
263-64 (Me. 1986).
70. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (emphasis added).
71. See id.; supra text accompanying note 33.
72. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
73. See id.
74. See id. (emphasis added).
75. To read this Rosenblatt language as excluding teachers from the public official
designation is to "seriously misapprehend[]" the Rosenblatt decision. Lorain Journal Co.
v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 958 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari
in 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984)); accord, Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz.
422, 425, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App. 1978); Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 989, 497
S.W.2d 47, 50 (1973); Luper v. Black Dispatch Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 1028, (Okla.
1978); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978).
76. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
77. See id. at 85.
78. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) ("[Tjeachers... possess a high
degree of responsibility and discretion in the fulfillment of a basic governmental obliga-
tion. They have direct, day-to-day contact with students, exercise unsupervised discre-
tion over them, act as role models, and influence their students about the government and
the political process." (emphasis added); see also infra note 83 and accompanying text
(discussing public's independent interest in qualifications and performance of teachers).
79. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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The Rosenblatt test was established in a case that held the former super-
visor of a county recreation area to the public official standard. 0 While
this defamation plaintiff managed public funds, s" his impact on the socie-
tal structure was insignificant when compared to those to whom we en-
trust the education of our children. To conclude that Mr. Rosenblatt
was a public official but that public school teachers are not is to assert
that the public has a greater interest in the management of recreation
areas than in the education of its children."
The Supreme Court long has recognized the public's strong, independ-
ent interest in the qualifications and performance of its school teachers.8 3
It has stated that "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments."8 4 Moreover, Justice Brennan, the author
of both the New York Times and the Rosenblatt decisions, has spoken out
for the proposition that public school teachers are public officials under
the Rosenblatt test.8  Justice Brennan made it clear that public comment
about teachers' qualifications and performance is exactly the type of dis-
cussion the first amendment should protect.8 6 According to Justice
Brennan, it follows that the status of teachers is that of public officials
under the standards set forth by the Court in New York Times and
80. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
81. See id. at 83.
82. Compare Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-88 (1966) (New York Times may
protect discussion about resort supervisor because he is a public official) with Nodar v.
Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (New York Times does not protect criticism of
public school teacher's performance because she is not a public official).
83. "[T]eachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that go[es] to the heart of
representative government.'" Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979) (upholding
American citizenship requirement for public school teachers) (quoting Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). "[Their] influence is crucial to the continued good health
of a democracy." See id. at 78-79 (illustrating government function exception to equal
protection bar to discrimination against aliens). Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (upholding school financing based on local tax reve-
nues); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (state's interest in universal educa-
tion must be balanced against free exercise clause of the first amendment).
84. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (striking down the separate
but equal doctrine).
85. In 1985, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case that presented the question
of teachers as New York Times public official defamation plaintiffs. See Lorain Journal
Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985). In dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice
Brennan stated: "[I]t is self-evident that 'the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance' of those who teach ... that goes 'beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees.' " Id.
at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari in 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d
1191 (1984)) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). Justice Brennan con-
cluded that "[t]o say that [the teacher defamation plaintiff] ... was not a public figure...
is simply nonsense." Id. at 964. The Ohio Supreme Court, relying heavily on Justice
Brennan's dissent from the denial of certiorari, expressly overruled Milkovich shortly af-
ter the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio
St. 3d 243, 247-48, 496 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (1986).
86. See Lorain Journal, 474 U.S. at 959-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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Rosenblatt. 7
Other contexts provide further support for the conclusion that teach-
ers are New York Times public officials. Public school teachers exercise
wide discretion in the performance of their duties88 and typically are re-
quired to take oaths of office, swearing allegiance to the Constitution of
the United States and of the state in which they teach. 9 Other govern-
ment employees who share these traits with school teachers, such as po-
lice officers,9" uniformly are held to be New York Times public officials.91
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the power of a teacher or other
school official to search a student for drugs within a school building ex-
ceeds the power given to a police officer in similar circumstances.9 2 If the
Court is to recognize more authority in teachers than in police officers in
a fourth amendment93 context at the same time it recognizes first amend-
ment protection for discussion about police officers, 94 it follows that it
should also apply the protection of New York Times to allegedly defama-
tory publications about teachers.95
87. See id.
88. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984).
89. See, eg., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 231.17 (1) (2) (Vest 1977) (repealed effective 1995);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.080 (Michie Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:26-9 (West
1968); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3002 (McKinney 1987).
90. See, eg., Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-303(3) (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-284
(1982).
91. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (Chicago Police Depart-
ment Deputy Chief of Detectives charged with brutality); Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 1985) (Philadelphia police officer
accused of bribe-taking), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1187 (1986); McKinley v. Baden, 777
F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (fired police officer accused of sexual intercourse with a
thirteen-year-old girl).
92. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (teachers do not need to obtain a
warrant before searching student under their authority suspected of wrongdoing). In
T.LO., the Court reasoned that the need to maintain discipline and security in schools
outweighed students' expectation of privacy. See id. at 339-40. The fourth amendment's
requirement of probable cause also was excused in favor of a test measuring whether the
search of the student, in light of the particular circumstances, was reasonable. See id. at
341. The Court based this holding on the "substantial need of teachers and administra-
tors for freedom to maintain order in the schools." Id.; see also Buss, The Fourth Amend-
ment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 746 (1974) ("There
is no suggestion in any of the cases that the police have special immunity to make war-
rantless searches in public schools without some facilitating action taken by school
officials.").
93. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. Coast. amend. IV.
94. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1187
(1986); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985).
95. In his T.LO. concurrence, Justice Powell recognized that "[a] State has a compel-
ling interest in assuring that the schools meet th[eir] responsibility [of educating and
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III. TEACHERS AS PUBLIC FIGURES
Courts refusing to apply the public official designation to teacher defa-
mation plaintiffs are not precluded from applying the actual malice stan-
dard to them. By holding a teacher is a public figure,96 courts still
constitutionally may protect comments about teachers.97
A. Public Figure Analysis in General
The Supreme Court extended the New York Times doctrine to "public
figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.98 Because certain defamation
plaintiffs "often play an influential role in ordering society," 99 these
"public figures" are held to the actual malice standard to further the
original purpose of the New York Times decision. 100
The Court refined the public figure doctrine in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,' 1o establishing two classes of defamation plaintiffs within the public
figure category: "all-purpose"1 °2 and "limited purpose" public figure
plaintiffs."3 To be counted among all-purpose public figures, a defama-
tion plaintiff must have achieved something akin to national fame."0 4 Be-
cause community public school teachers typically do not reach this
requisite level of fame, they cannot be designated all-purpose public
figures for defamation law purposes.
Limited purpose public figures, on the other hand, are easier to find
because their "fame" is linked to a specific public controversy, 10 5 to
training young people]." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31111. App. 3d 270, 274, 334 N.E.2d
442, 447 (1975); Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 216-17, 626 P.2d 785, 790 (1981).
97. See, e.g., Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 321 N.E.2d 739,
741-42 (1974).
98. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
99. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
100. See id. at 163 ("differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials'...
[has] no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy").
101. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
102. See id. at 345 ("[Tjhose who attain this status have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society [and] [s]ome occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.").
103. See id. ("[T]hose classed as [limited purpose] public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved.").
104. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (television
preacher); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.
1979) (professional football player); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976)
(nationally prominent political commentator), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Carson
v. Allied News Corp., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny).
105. Teacher defamation claims arise from publicized controversies that relate to their
qualifications and performance. Such controversies have included discussion about a
teacher's general professional fitness, see Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d
47 (1973); Foote v. Sarafyan, 432 So. 2d 877, 878 (La. App. 1982); True v. Ladner, 513
A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1986), the selection of textbooks, see Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App.
3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979); Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31 Ill. App. 3d
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which the defamatory statement at issue relates.10 6 Whether a school
teacher is a limited purpose public figure turns on whether the teacher
has assumed the risk of defamation"07 and whether he has sufficient ac-
cess to the self-help remedy. 08
State courts divide on the question of whether public school teachers
are limited purpose public figures for New York Times purposes. Some
find that teachers are public figures for the limited purpose of certain
controversies surrounding their professional responsibilities and, as such,
are subject to the actual malice requirement."° Others simply hold
teachers do not satisfy the Gertz criteria, and are not to be held to the
New York Times standard.' 10
B. Teachers Should Be Deemed Public Figures
A fair reading of the risk assumption"' and self-help" 2 criteria of
Gertz leads one to conclude that courts should consider teachers limited
purpose public figures and that teachers should be required to prove ac-
tual malice. While public school teachers rarely achieve the fame or
power in their capacity as teachers necessary to be deemed all-purpose
270, 272, 334 N.E.2d 442, 444 (1975), and a teacher's disciplinary methods, see Johnston
v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
106. See e.g., Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(air traf.c controller on duty at time of plane crash), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986);
Street v. NBC, Inc., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981) (witness who testified at infa-
mous trial in 1931 held to be a public figure for purposes of a defamation suit arising from
her portrayal on television program forty years later); Johnson v. Board of Junior Col-
lege, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1975) (college professors embroiled
in controversy over their textbook selection).
107. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text. Private individuals become limited
purpose public figures because they have invited attention and comment. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). Lower courts have held such figures to
the actual malice standard on a risk assumption theory. See True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d
257, 264 (Me. 1986).
108. The Gertz Court, reaffirming the availability of the Curtis self-help remedy as a
prerequisite for finding a defamation plaintiff to be a public figure, stated:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using available op-
portunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its
adverse impact on reputation.... [P]ublic figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individu-
als normally enjoy.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
109. See; e.g., Johnson v. Board of Junior College, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276 & n.l, 334
N.E.2d 442, 447 & n.1 (1975); Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 217, 626 P.2d 785, 790
(1981).
110. See e.g., Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136
(1979); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); McCutcheon v. Moran, 99
Ill. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 263-
64 (Me. 1986).
111. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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public figures under Gertz,'1 3 the limited purpose public figure classifica-
tion easily applies because the defamation at issue necessarily concerns
the teacher in his professional capacity." 4 The public controversy al-
ways exists in these publications by virtue of the fact that teachers are
public employees in positions of intense public interest.115
Courts finding teachers not to be public figures purport to base their
conclusions on the Gertz criteria.11 The reasoning employed by these
courts, however, cannot survive close scrutiny. 7 For example, the Cali-
fornia appellate court, in Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent and Protec-
tive Order of Elks,"8 construed the Gertz risk-assumption test to require
a plaintiff voluntarily and actively to have sought to influence the resolu-
tion of a controversy in order to be designated a limited purpose public
figure." 9 It did not acknowledge, however, that voluntariness and activ-
ism are not mandated by Gertz or its progeny.120 Even if Franklin is
correct in its interpretation of Gertz, this approach should include, not
exclude, teachers from the limited purpose public figure category. Part
of a teacher's job, if done correctly, is to "voluntarily and actively [seek]
... to influence the resolution of the issues"' 12 1 such as the selection of
curricula, textbooks and methods of discipline. To assume otherwise is
to assume a teacher is not doing his job.
113. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); see also supra notes
390-95 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. "To say that [the teacher defama-
tion plaintiff] nevertheless was not a [limited purpose] public figure ... is simply non-
sense." Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from a denial of certiorari to 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984)).
115. See, e.g., Basarich v. Rodegehro, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742
(1974).
116. See Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979);
McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 Ill. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1981); True
v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986).
117. See, e.g., Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (court, even while
citing Gertz, bypassed public figure analysis and erroneously concluded "[b]ecause plain-
tiff was not a public official, New York Times [did] not apply") (emphasis added); Mc-
Cutcheon, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 425 N.E.2d at 1133 (holding the teacher-plaintiff not a
public figure under Gertz, based on the fact that she was not paid with public funds);
True, 513 A.2d at 264 (court raised both the self-help and risk assumption tests, but
dismissed both with conclusory statements).
118. 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
119. See id. at 929, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 140 ("In our view the definition of 'public figure'
... incorporates as an element a requirement that the libel plaintiff must have voluntarily
and actively sought, in connection with any given matter of public interest, to influence
the resolution of the issues involved.") (emphasis in original).
120. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) ("[A]n individual vol-
untarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby be-
comes a public figure for a limited range of issues.") (emphasis added); Dameron v.
Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Injection is not the only
means by which public-figure status is achieved. Persons can become involved in public
controversies and affairs without their consent or will [and still be deemed public
figures]."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
121. See Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 929, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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In finding a teacher to be a private defamation plaintiff,"U Franklin
also misinterprets the Supreme Court's directive in Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Association.'23 In Wolston, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the pub-
lic figure inquiry should focus on "the 'nature and extent of an individ-
ual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
defamation'. "124 Relying on this language, Franklin holds that a teacher
who has chosen a controversial textbook for her high school class is not
involved in the ensuing controversy in a sufficient nature or to a sufficient
extent to support a finding that she is a public figure for the limited pur-
pose of discussion about her book selection.' 25
The Franklin court failed to recognize that teachers "invite attention
and comment"' 26 simply by accepting a public teaching position with the
knowledge that, to justify their public trust, they must do more than
merely keep their students off the street.'27 As stated earlier, this view of
the teacher's role-as something beyond mere lecturer or supervisor-
has been recognized expressly by the Supreme Court.' 28 Thus, by virute
of their position as public employees, teachers assume the risk of
defamation. 129
The reasoning of the California court rests on the contentions that the
teacher did not anticipate or intend that her choice of books would result
in controversy. 130 Franklin clearly applies the wrong standard, as it is
irrelevant whether a defamation plaintiff anticipated or intended to cause
the controversy giving rise to the defamation.' 3' Wolston limits the in-
quiry to the nature and extent of a plaintiff's involvement in a controver-
122. See id at 928, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
123. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
124. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974)). Sixteen years after pleading guilty to a
contempt charge following his failing to answer a subpoena, the plaintiff in Molston was
falsely accused of being a Soviet agent who had been indicted on espionage charges. See
id. The plaintiff's only involvement with the controversy giving rise to the defamation
was that his aunt and uncle had been convicted of espionage and that he failed, for health
reasons, to respond to a subpoena to testify about them. See id. at 161-62. The Supreme
Court held the nature and extent of his involvement in the controversy were too remote
to support an application of the New York Times actual malice standard on a limited
purpose public figure theory. See id. at 167-68.
125. See Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 930-31, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
126. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
127. Cf. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) ("[Teachers] have direct, day-to-
day contact with students, exercise unsupervised discretion over them, act as role models,
and influence their students about the government and the political process.").
128. See id.
129. Cf. Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(defamation plaintiffs can become involved in public controversies against their will and
still be held to the actual malice standard on a limited-purpose public figure theory), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
130. See Franklin v. BPOE, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 930-31, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 140-41
(1979).
131. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
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sial matter. 32 Had it properly applied the Wolston standard, the
California court would have found the teacher-plaintiff to be a limited
purpose public figure and held her to the actual malice standard.
The media's interest in education in general, and in teachers in partic-
ular, is well-documented. 33 This attention from the media merely re-
flects the great public interest in the people who teach our children. It
also offers overwhelming proof that school teachers indeed have greater
access to the communications media than the ordinary citizen usually
enjoys. 134 For example, the New York Times devotes two pages each
week exclusively to the discussion of education issues. 35
Teachers' access to the self-help remedy is consolidated by their union
affiliations. The everyday activities of teachers' unions receive prominent
coverage by the press, both as news 36 and as editorial items. 13 7 Teachers
also have ample opportunity to be heard within their own community,
through scholarly journals.38 and local media, whose desire to pay atten-
tion to teachers is documented by the coverage giving rise to many defa-
mation cases. 139 Because public school teachers satisfy both the risk-
assumption and self-help elements of the limited purpose public figure
test, courts should consider them public figures for the purpose of apply-
ing the New York Times actual malice standard.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny is to en-
courage robust discussion of issues of public concern and to protect indi-
viduals who speak out on those issues. Education is undeniably an area
of intense concern to the public, and educators are the most appropriate
132. See id. at 167.
133. A recent, unscientific survey of the New York Times indictates the prominent
role education and teachers play in the news media. See, e.g., National Rise Reported in
Teacher Pay, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at D14, col. 1; Study Suggests Poor Readers Are
Hurt by Teachers' Tactics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at D14, col. 3; Custodian vs. Princi-
pal: Stacked Deck, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at B1, col. 2. The installation of a new
New York City Schools Chancellor received both prominent news coverage, see Green, at
Induction, Appeals for Help, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at B1 col. 2, and editorial com-
ment, see Chancellor Green's Good Fight, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988 at A38, col. 4.
The unorthodox methods of principal Joe Clark of Eastside High School in Paterson,
New Jersey attracted so much media attention that the White House took notice and
offered him a job. See Sixty Minutes: Joe Clark (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 6, 1988);
Why Johnny Can't Speak, The Nation, Jan. 30, 1988, at 109.
134. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
135. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at B8, col. 1.
136. See, e.g., Life After Shanker Leader Mends Fences, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1988, at
B I, col. 2.
137. Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers, has a weekly
opinion column in the New York Times paid for by the union. See Where We Stand,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1988, § 4 at 9, col. 1.
138. The Current Index to Journals in Education lists more than seven hundred publi-
cations, all by or about educators. See Current Index to Journals in Education (Semian-
nual Cumulation, Jan.-June, 1987).
139. See supra note 105.
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focus of that concern. Application of the New York Times actual malice
standard to discussion about teachers in their professional capacity not
only safeguards public debate on a critical national issue but also encour-
ages involvement by parents and other members of local communities in
the education process. The absence of such involvement threatens our
most precious national resource.
Peter S. Cane

